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GLEP: 39
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Title: An "old-school" metastructure proposal with "boot for being a slacker"
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Version: $Revision: 1.5 $
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Last-Modified: $Date: 2008/01/20 02:56:39 $
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Author: Grant Goodyear <g2boojum@gentoo.org>,
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Ciaran McCreesh <ciaranm@gentoo.org>,
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Status: Accepted
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Type: Informational
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Content-Type: text/x-rst
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Created: 01-Sep-2005
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Post-History: 01-Sep-2005, 09-Feb-2006, 12-Oct-2007, 19-Jan-2008
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Status
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======
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Implemented. GLEP amended on 09 Feb 2006 to add the final bullet point to
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list B in `Specification`_.
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Abstract
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========
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GLEP 4 is replaced with a new "metastructure" that retains established
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projects (and makes new projects easier to create), but adds a new "Gentoo
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Council" to handle global (cross-project) issues.
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Motivation
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==========
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The Fosdem and subsequent reform proposals shepherded by Koon are thorough,
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extremely detailed, and somewhat complicated. They have a lot of good ideas.
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For many who have been with Gentoo a long time, though, there's just something
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about them that they don't really like. More than a few Gentoo devs are
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almost entirely uninterested in metastructure as long as it doesn't get in
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their way, and because the current proposals impose at least some order on our
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unruly devs these proposals are guaranteed to "get in the way" to some degree.
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For example, a frequent comment that has been heard is that many Gentoo devs
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don't know who his/her manager (or project lead) is, which is a clear
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indication that our current system is broken. The existing proposals solve
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the problem by requiring that each dev belong to a project. Perhaps the part
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that is broken, though, is the belief that every dev should have a manager.
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The history of Gentoo is such that traditionally big advances have often been
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implemented by a single or a small number of dedicated devs (thus our
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long-standing tradition that devs have access to the entire tree), and surely
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we do not want to make things harder (or less fun) for such people. So here's
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a minimal proposal for those who remembers the "good ol' days" and thinks
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things aren't really so different now.
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Synopsis of the current system:
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* There are 13-15 top-level projects (TLPs). Top-level projects are
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comprised of sub-projects, and the goal was that every Gentoo
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project would be a sub-project of one of the TLPs. Supposedly each
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dev therefore belongs to one or more TLPs.
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* Each TLP has at least a "strategic" manager, and potentially also an
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"operational" manager. Only the strategic managers vote on global
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Gentoo issues.
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* The managers of each TLP were appointed by drobbins, the other
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TLP managers, or elected by their project members. These managers
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have no set term.
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* Within each TLP the managers are responsible for making decisions
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about the project, defining clear goals, roadmaps, and timelines
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for the project, and solving problems that arise within the TLP
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(see GLEP 4 for the specific list).
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* The strategic TLP managers are also responsible for deciding issues that
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affect Gentoo across project lines. The primary mechanism for
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handling global-scope issues is the managers' meetings.
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* Disciplinary action taken against erring devs is handled by the
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"devrel" TLP, unless the dev is a strategic TLP manager. In that
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case disciplinary action must be enacted by the other strategic TLP
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managers.
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Problems with the existing system:
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1. The assumption that TLPs are complete is either incorrect (there
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still is no "server" TLP) or just plain weird (but the lack of a
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server TLP is technically okay because all devs who don't have an
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obvious TLP belong to the "base" TLP by default).
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2. There is nothing at all to ensure that project leads actually do
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represent the devs they supposedly lead or satisfy their
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responsibilities. Indeed, should a TLP manager go AWOL it is not at
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all obvious how the situation should be resolved.
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3. Nothing is being decided at global scope right now. Some TLP strategic
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managers rarely attend the managers' meetings, and the managers as a
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whole certainly are not providing any sort of global vision for
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Gentoo right now.
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4. Even if the strategic TLP managers were making global decisions for
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Gentoo, the TLP structure is such that almost all devs fall under
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only one or two TLPs. Thus voting on global issues is hardly
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proportional, and thus many devs feel disenfranchised.
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5. Regardless of whether or not it is justified, devrel is loathed by
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many in its enforcement role.
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Here's a couple of additional problems identified by the current
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metastructure reform proposals:
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6. The current system has no mechanism for identifying either projects
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or devs that have gone inactive.
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7. Bugs that cut across projects often remain unresolved.
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8. GLEPs often linger in an undetermined state.
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Specification
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=============
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A. A project is a group of developers working towards a goal (or a set
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of goals).
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* A project exists if it has a web page at
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www.g.o/proj/en/whatever that is maintained. ("Maintained" means
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that the information on the page is factually correct and not
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out-of-date.) If the webpage isn't maintained, it is presumed dead.
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* It may have one or many leads, and the leads are
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selected by the members of the project. This selection must
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occur at least once every 12 months, and may occur at any
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time.
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* It may have zero or more sub-projects. Sub-projects are
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just projects that provide some additional structure, and their
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web pages are in the project's space.
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* Not everything (or everyone) needs a project.
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* Projects need not be long-term.
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* Projects may well conflict with other projects. That's okay.
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* Any dev may create a new project just by creating a new page
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(or, more realistically, directory and page) in
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``gentoo/xml/htdocs/proj/en`` and sending a Request For Comments
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(RFC) e-mail to gentoo-dev. Note that this GLEP does not provide for
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a way for the community at large to block a new project, even if the
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comments are wholly negative.
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B. Global issues will be decided by an elected Gentoo council.
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* There will be a set number of council members. (For the
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first election that number was set to 7 by acclamation.)
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* Council members will be chosen by a general election of all
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devs once per year.
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* The council must hold an open meeting at least once per month.
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* Council decisions are by majority vote of those who show up (or
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their proxies).
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* If a council member (or their appointed proxy) fails to show up for
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two consecutive meetings, they are marked as a slacker.
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* If a council member who has been marked a slacker misses any further
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meeting (or their appointed proxy doesn't show up), they lose their
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position and a new election is held to replace that person. The newly
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elected council member gets a 'reduced' term so that the yearly
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elections still elect a full group.
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* Council members who have previously been booted for excessive slacking
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may stand for future elections, including the election for their
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replacement. They should, however, justify their slackerness, and
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should expect to have it pointed out if they don't do so themselves.
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* The 'slacker' marker is reset when a member is elected.
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* If any meeting has less than 50% attendance by council members, a new
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election for *all* places must be held within a month. The 'one year'
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is then reset from that point.
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* Disciplinary actions may be appealed to the council.
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* A proxy must not be an existing council member, and any single person
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may not be a proxy for more than one council member at any given
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meeting.
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Rationale
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=========
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So, does this proposal solve any of the previously-mentioned problems?
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1. There is no longer any requirement that the project structure be
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complete. Some devs work on very specific parts of the tree, while
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some work on practically everything; neither should be shoehorned into
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an ad-hoc project structure. Moreover, it should be easy to create new
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projects where needed (and remove them when they are not), which this
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proposal should enable.
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2. By having the members choose their project leads periodically, the
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project leads are necessarily at least somewhat responsible (and hopefully
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responsive) to the project members. This proposal has removed the list of
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responsibilities that project leads were supposed to satisfy, since hardly
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anybody has ever looked at the original list since it was written. Instead
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the practical responsibility of a lead is "whatever the members require", and
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if that isn't satisfied, the members can get a new lead (if they can find
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somebody to take the job!).
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3. If the council does a lousy job handling global issues (or has no
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global vision), vote out the bums.
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4. Since everybody gets to vote for the council members, at least in
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principle the council members represent all developers, not just a
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particular subset.
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5. An appeal process should make disciplinary enforcement both less
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capricious and more palatable.
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6. This proposal doesn't help find inactive devs or projects. It
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really should not be that much of a problem. We already have a script for
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identifying devs who haven't made a CVS commit within a certain period of
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time. As for moribund projects, if the project page isn't maintained, it's
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dead, and we should remove it. That, too, could be automated. A much bigger
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problem is understaffed herds, but more organization is not necessarily a
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solution.
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7. The metabug project is a great idea. Let's do that! Adding a useful
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project shouldn't require "metastructure reform", although with the
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current system it does. With this proposal it wouldn't.
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8. This proposal has nothing to say about GLEPs.
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Copyright
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=========
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This document has been placed in the public domain.
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