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25<tbody valign="top"> 25<tbody valign="top">
26<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">GLEP:</th><td class="field-body">59</td> 26<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">GLEP:</th><td class="field-body">59</td>
27</tr> 27</tr>
28<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Title:</th><td class="field-body">Manifest2 hash policies and security implications</td> 28<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Title:</th><td class="field-body">Manifest2 hash policies and security implications</td>
29</tr> 29</tr>
30<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Version:</th><td class="field-body">1.11</td> 30<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Version:</th><td class="field-body">1.9</td>
31</tr> 31</tr>
32<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Last-Modified:</th><td class="field-body"><a class="reference external" href="http://www.gentoo.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/xml/htdocs/proj/en/glep/glep-0059.txt?cvsroot=gentoo">2008/07/13 02:23:36</a></td> 32<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Last-Modified:</th><td class="field-body"><a class="reference external" href="http://www.gentoo.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/xml/htdocs/proj/en/glep/glep-0059.txt?cvsroot=gentoo">2010/04/07 21:34:24</a></td>
33</tr> 33</tr>
34<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Author:</th><td class="field-body">Robin Hugh Johnson &lt;robbat2&#32;&#97;t&#32;gentoo.org&gt;,</td> 34<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Author:</th><td class="field-body">Robin Hugh Johnson &lt;robbat2&#32;&#97;t&#32;gentoo.org&gt;,</td>
35</tr> 35</tr>
36<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Status:</th><td class="field-body">Draft</td> 36<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Status:</th><td class="field-body">Draft</td>
37</tr> 37</tr>
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41</tr> 41</tr>
42<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Requires:</th><td class="field-body"><a class="reference external" href="http://www.gentoo.org/proj/en/glepglep-0044.html">44</a></td> 42<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Requires:</th><td class="field-body"><a class="reference external" href="http://www.gentoo.org/proj/en/glepglep-0044.html">44</a></td>
43</tr> 43</tr>
44<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Created:</th><td class="field-body">October 2006</td> 44<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Created:</th><td class="field-body">October 2006</td>
45</tr> 45</tr>
46<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Updated:</th><td class="field-body">November 2007, June 2008, July 2008</td> 46<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Updated:</th><td class="field-body">November 2007, June 2008, July 2008, October 2008, January 2010</td>
47</tr> 47</tr>
48<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Updates:</th><td class="field-body">44</td> 48<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Updates:</th><td class="field-body">44</td>
49</tr>
50<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Post-History:</th><td class="field-body">December 2009, January 2010</td>
49</tr> 51</tr>
50</tbody> 52</tbody>
51</table> 53</table>
52<hr /> 54<hr />
53<div class="contents topic" id="contents"> 55<div class="contents topic" id="contents">
54<p class="topic-title first">Contents</p> 56<p class="topic-title first">Contents</p>
55<ul class="simple"> 57<ul class="simple">
56<li><a class="reference internal" href="#abstract" id="id1">Abstract</a></li> 58<li><a class="reference internal" href="#abstract" id="id2">Abstract</a></li>
57<li><a class="reference internal" href="#motivation" id="id2">Motivation</a></li> 59<li><a class="reference internal" href="#motivation" id="id3">Motivation</a></li>
58<li><a class="reference internal" href="#specification" id="id3">Specification</a><ul> 60<li><a class="reference internal" href="#specification" id="id4">Specification</a><ul>
59<li><a class="reference internal" href="#the-bad-news" id="id4">The bad news</a></li> 61<li><a class="reference internal" href="#the-bad-news" id="id5">The bad news</a></li>
60<li><a class="reference internal" href="#how-fast-can-md5-be-broken" id="id5">How fast can MD5 be broken?</a></li> 62<li><a class="reference internal" href="#how-fast-can-md5-be-broken" id="id6">How fast can MD5 be broken?</a></li>
61<li><a class="reference internal" href="#the-good-news" id="id6">The good news</a></li> 63<li><a class="reference internal" href="#the-good-news" id="id7">The good news</a></li>
62<li><a class="reference internal" href="#what-should-be-done" id="id7">What should be done</a><ul> 64<li><a class="reference internal" href="#what-should-be-done" id="id8">What should be done</a></li>
63<li><a class="reference internal" href="#checksum-depreciation" id="id8">Checksum depreciation</a></li> 65<li><a class="reference internal" href="#checksum-depreciation-timing" id="id9">Checksum depreciation timing</a><ul>
66<li><a class="reference internal" href="#general-principles" id="id10">General principles:</a></li>
67<li><a class="reference internal" href="#immediate-plans" id="id11">Immediate plans:</a></li>
64</ul> 68</ul>
65</li> 69</li>
66</ul> 70</ul>
67</li> 71</li>
68<li><a class="reference internal" href="#backwards-compatibility" id="id9">Backwards Compatibility</a></li> 72<li><a class="reference internal" href="#backwards-compatibility" id="id12">Backwards Compatibility</a></li>
69<li><a class="reference internal" href="#references" id="id10">References</a></li> 73<li><a class="reference internal" href="#references" id="id13">References</a></li>
70<li><a class="reference internal" href="#thanks-to" id="id11">Thanks to</a></li> 74<li><a class="reference internal" href="#thanks-to" id="id14">Thanks to</a></li>
75<li><a class="reference internal" href="#id1" id="id15">References</a></li>
71<li><a class="reference internal" href="#copyright" id="id12">Copyright</a></li> 76<li><a class="reference internal" href="#copyright" id="id16">Copyright</a></li>
72</ul> 77</ul>
73</div> 78</div>
74<div class="section" id="abstract"> 79<div class="section" id="abstract">
75<h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id1">Abstract</a></h1> 80<h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id2">Abstract</a></h1>
76<p>While Manifest2 format allows multiple hashes, the question of which 81<p>While Manifest2 format allows multiple hashes, the question of which
77checksums should be present, why, and the security implications of such 82checksums should be present, why, and the security implications of such
78have never been resolved. This GLEP covers all of these issues, and 83have never been resolved. This GLEP covers all of these issues, and
79makes recommendations as to how to handle checksums both now, and in 84makes recommendations as to how to handle checksums both now, and in
80future.</p> 85future.</p>
81</div> 86</div>
82<div class="section" id="motivation"> 87<div class="section" id="motivation">
83<h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id2">Motivation</a></h1> 88<h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id3">Motivation</a></h1>
84<p>This GLEP is being written as part of the work on signing the Portage 89<p>This GLEP is being written as part of the work on signing the Portage
85tree, but is only tangentially related to the actual signing of 90tree, but is only tangentially related to the actual signing of
86Manifests. Checksums present one possible weak point in the overall 91Manifests. Checksums present one possible weak point in the overall
87security of the tree - and a comprehensive security plan is needed.</p> 92security of the tree - and a comprehensive security plan is needed.</p>
93<p>This GLEP is not mandatory for the tree-signing specification, but
94instead aims to improve the security of the hashes used in Manifest2
95[GLEP44]. As such, it is also able to stand on it's own.</p>
88</div> 96</div>
89<div class="section" id="specification"> 97<div class="section" id="specification">
90<h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id3">Specification</a></h1> 98<h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id4">Specification</a></h1>
91<div class="section" id="the-bad-news"> 99<div class="section" id="the-bad-news">
92<h2><a class="toc-backref" href="#id4">The bad news</a></h2> 100<h2><a class="toc-backref" href="#id5">The bad news</a></h2>
93<p>First of all, I'd like to cover the bad news in checksum security. 101<p>First of all, I'd like to cover the bad news in checksum security.
94A much discussed point, as been the simple question: What is the 102A much discussed point, as been the simple question: What is the
95security of multiple independent checksums on the same data? 103security of multiple independent checksums on the same data?
96The most common position (and indeed the one previously held by myself), 104The most common position (and indeed the one previously held by myself),
97is that multiple checksums would be an increase in security, but we 105is that multiple checksums would be an increase in security, but we
98could not provably quantify the amount of security this added. 106could not provably quantify the amount of security this added.
99The really bad news, is that this position is completely and utterly 107The really bad news, is that this position is completely and utterly
100wrong. Many of you will be aghast at this. There is extremely little 108wrong. Many of you will be aghast at this. There is extremely little
101added security in multiple checksums [J04]. For any set of checksums, 109added security in multiple checksums as noted by Joux [J04]. For any set
102the actual strength lies in that of the strongest checksum.</p> 110of checksums, the actual strength lies in that of the strongest
111checksum.</p>
112<p>Wang et al [W04] extended Joux's [J04] work on SHA-0 to cover MD4, MD5,
113HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD families of hashes.</p>
103</div> 114</div>
104<div class="section" id="how-fast-can-md5-be-broken"> 115<div class="section" id="how-fast-can-md5-be-broken">
105<h2><a class="toc-backref" href="#id5">How fast can MD5 be broken?</a></h2> 116<h2><a class="toc-backref" href="#id6">How fast can MD5 be broken?</a></h2>
106<p>For a general collision, not a pre-image attack, since the original 117<p>For a general collision, not a pre-image attack, since the announcement
107announcement by Wang et al [W04], the time required to break MD5 has 118by Wang et al [W04], the time required to break MD5 has been massively
108been massively reduced. Originally at 1 hour on a near-supercomputer 119reduced. Originally at 1 hour on a near-supercomputer (IBM P690) and
109(IBM P690) and estimated at 64 hours with a Pentium-3 1.7Ghz. This has 120estimated at 64 hours with a Pentium-3 1.7Ghz. This has gone down to
110gone down to less than in two years, to 17 seconds [K06a]!</p> 121less than in two years, to 17 seconds [K06a].</p>
122<ul class="simple">
111<p>08/2004 - 1 hour, IBM pSeries 690 (32x 1.7Ghz POWER4+) = 54.4 GHz-Hours 123<li>08/2004 - 1 hour, IBM pSeries 690 (32x 1.7Ghz POWER4+) = 54.4 GHz-Hours</li>
11203/2005 - 8 hours, Pentium-M 1.6Ghz = 12.8 Ghz-Hours 124<li>03/2005 - 8 hours, Pentium-M 1.6Ghz = 12.8 Ghz-Hours</li>
11311/2005 - 5 hours, Pentium-4 1.7Ghz = 8.5 Ghz-Hours 125<li>11/2005 - 5 hours, Pentium-4 1.7Ghz = 8.5 Ghz-Hours</li>
11403/2006 - 1 minute, Pentium-4 3.2Ghz = .05 Ghz-Hours 126<li>03/2006 - 1 minute, Pentium-4 3.2Ghz = .05 Ghz-Hours</li>
11504/2006 - 17 seconds, Pentium-4 3.2Ghz = .01 Ghz-Hours</p> 127<li>04/2006 - 17 seconds, Pentium-4 3.2Ghz = .01 Ghz-Hours</li>
128</ul>
116<p>If we accept a factor of 800x as a sample of how much faster a checksum 129<p>If we accept a factor of 800x as a sample of how much faster a checksum
117may be broken over the course of 2 years (MD5 using the above data is 130may be broken over the course of 2 years (MD5 using the above data is
118&gt;2000x), then existing checksums do not stand a significant chance of 131&gt;2000x), then existing checksums do not stand a significant chance of
119survival in the future. We should thus accept that whatever checksums we 132survival in the future. We should thus accept that whatever checksums we
120are using today, will be broken in the near future, and plan as best as 133are using today, will be broken in the near future, and plan as best as
121possible. (A brief review [H04] of the present SHA1 attacks indicates an 134possible. (A brief review [H04] of the SHA1 attacks indicates an
122improvement of ~600x in the same timespan).</p> 135improvement of ~600x in the same timespan).</p>
123<p>And for those that claim implementation of these procedures is not yet 136<p>And for those that claim implementation of these procedures is not yet
124feasible, see [K06b] for an application that can produce two 137feasible, see [K06b] for an application that can produce two
125self-extracting .exe files, with identical MD5s, and whatever payload 138self-extracting EXE files, with identical MD5s, and whatever payload you
126you want.</p> 139want.</p>
127</div> 140</div>
128<div class="section" id="the-good-news"> 141<div class="section" id="the-good-news">
129<h2><a class="toc-backref" href="#id6">The good news</a></h2> 142<h2><a class="toc-backref" href="#id7">The good news</a></h2>
130<p>Of the checksums presently used by Manifest2, one stands close to being 143<p>Of the checksums presently used by Manifest2 (SHA1, SHA256, RIPEMD160),
131completely broken: SHA1. The SHA2 series has suffered some attacks, but 144one stands close to being completely broken: SHA1; and another is
132still remains reasonably solid [G07],[K08]. No attacks against RIPEMD160 145significantly weakened: RIPEMD160. The SHA2 series has suffered some
133have been published, however it is constructed in the same manner as 146attacks, but still remains reasonably solid [G07],[K08].</p>
134MD5, SHA1 and SHA2, so is also vulnerable to the new methods of
135cryptanalysis [H04].</p>
136<p>To reduce the potential for future problems and any single checksum 147<p>To reduce the potential for future problems and any single checksum
137break leading to a rapid decrease in security, we should incorporate the 148break leading to a rapid decrease in security, we should incorporate the
138strongest hash available from each family of checksums, and be prepared 149strongest hash available from each family of checksums, and be prepared
139to retire old checksums actively, unless there is a overriding reason to 150to retire old checksums actively, unless there is a overriding reason to
140keep a specific checksum.</p> 151keep a specific checksum, such as part of a migration plan.</p>
141</div> 152</div>
142<div class="section" id="what-should-be-done"> 153<div class="section" id="what-should-be-done">
143<h2><a class="toc-backref" href="#id7">What should be done</a></h2> 154<h2><a class="toc-backref" href="#id8">What should be done</a></h2>
144<p>Portage should always try to verify all supported hashes that are 155<p>Portage should always try to verify all supported hashes that are
145available in a Manifest2, starting with the strongest ones as maintained 156available in a Manifest2, starting with the strongest ones as maintained
146by a preference list. Over time, the weaker checksums should be removed 157by a preference list. Over time, the weaker checksums should be removed
147from Manifest2 files, once all old Portage installations have had 158from Manifest2 files, once all old Portage installations have had
148sufficient time to upgrade. We should be prepared to add stronger 159sufficient time to upgrade. Stronger checksums shall be added as soon as
149checksums wherever possible, and to remove those that have been 160an implementation is available in Portage. Weak checksums may be removed
150defeated.</p> 161as long as the depreciation process is followed (see below).</p>
162<p>As soon as feasible, we should add the SHA512 and WHIRLPOOL algorithms.
163In future, as stream-based checksums are developed (in response to the
164development by NIST [AHS]), they should be considered and used.</p>
165<p>The SHA512 algorithm is available in Python 2.5, which has been a
166dependency of Portage since approximately Portage 2.1.6.13.</p>
167<p>The WHIRLPOOL checksum is not available within the PyCrypto library or
168hashlib that is part of Python 2.5, but there are multiple alternative
169Python implementations available, ranging from pure Python to C-based
170(python-mhash).</p>
151<p>An unsupported hash is not considered to be a failure unless no 171<p>The existence unsupported hash is not considered to be a failure unless
152supported hashes are available.</p> 172no supported hashes are available for a given Manifest entry.</p>
173</div>
153<div class="section" id="checksum-depreciation"> 174<div class="section" id="checksum-depreciation-timing">
154<h3><a class="toc-backref" href="#id8">Checksum depreciation</a></h3> 175<h2><a class="toc-backref" href="#id9">Checksum depreciation timing</a></h2>
155<p>For the current Portage, SHA1 should be gradually removed, as presents 176<div class="section" id="general-principles">
156no advantages over SHA256. Beyond one specific problem (see the next 177<h3><a class="toc-backref" href="#id10">General principles:</a></h3>
157paragraph), we should add SHA512 (SHA2, 512 bit size), the Whirlpool 178<p>A minimum set of depreciated checksums shall be maintained only to
158checksum (standardized checksum, with no known weaknesses). In future, 179support old package manager versions where needed by historically used
159as stream-based checksums are developed (in response to the development 180trees:</p>
160by NIST [AHS]), they should be considered and used.</p> 181<ul class="simple">
161<p>There is one temporary stumbling block at hand - the existing Portage 182<li>New package manager versions should NOT use depreciated checksums in</li>
162infrastructure does not support SHA384/512 or Whirlpool, thus hampering 183<li>New trees with that have never used the depreciated checksums may omit
163their immediate acceptance. SHA512 is available in Python 2.5, while 184them for reasons of size, but are still strongly suggested to include
164SHA1 is already available in Python 2.4. After Python2.5 is established 185them.</li>
165in a Gentoo media release, that would be a suitable time to remove SHA1 186<li>Removal of depreciated checksums shall happen after no less than 18
166from Manifest2 files.</p> 187months or one major Portage version cycle, whichever is greater.</li>
188</ul>
189</div>
190<div class="section" id="immediate-plans">
191<h3><a class="toc-backref" href="#id11">Immediate plans:</a></h3>
192<p>For the current Portage, both SHA1 and RIPEMD160 should be immediately
193removed, as they present no advantages over the already present SHA256.
194SHA256 cannot be replaced immediately with SHA512, as existing Portage
195versions need at least one supported algorithm present (SHA256 support
196was added in June 2006), so it must be retained for some while.</p>
197<p>Immediately:</p>
198<ul class="simple">
199<li>Add WHIRLPOOL and SHA512.</li>
200<li>Remove SHA1 and RIPEMD160.</li>
201</ul>
202<p>After the majority of Portage installations include SHA512 support:</p>
203<ul class="simple">
204<li>Remove SHA256.</li>
205</ul>
167</div> 206</div>
168</div> 207</div>
169</div> 208</div>
170<div class="section" id="backwards-compatibility"> 209<div class="section" id="backwards-compatibility">
171<h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id9">Backwards Compatibility</a></h1> 210<h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id12">Backwards Compatibility</a></h1>
172<p>Old versions of Portage may support and expect only specific checksums. 211<p>Old versions of Portage may support and expect only specific checksums.
173This is accounted for in the checksum depreciation discussion.</p> 212This is accounted for in the checksum depreciation discussion.</p>
213<p>For maximum compatiability, we should only have to include each of the
214old algorithms that we are officially still supporting, as well as the
215new ones that we prefer.</p>
174</div> 216</div>
175<div class="section" id="references"> 217<div class="section" id="references">
176<h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id10">References</a></h1> 218<h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id13">References</a></h1>
177<dl class="docutils"> 219<dl class="docutils">
178<dt>[AHS] NIST (2007). &quot;NIST's Plan for New Cryptographic Hash Functions&quot;,</dt> 220<dt>[AHS] NIST (2007). &quot;NIST's Plan for New Cryptographic Hash Functions&quot;,</dt>
179<dd>(Advanced Hash Standard). <a class="reference external" href="http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/HashWorkshop/">http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/HashWorkshop/</a></dd> 221<dd>(Advanced Hash Standard). <a class="reference external" href="http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/HashWorkshop/">http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/HashWorkshop/</a></dd>
180<dt>[BOBO06] Boneh, D. and Boyen, X. (2006). &quot;On the Impossibility of</dt> 222<dt>[BOBO06] Boneh, D. and Boyen, X. (2006). &quot;On the Impossibility of</dt>
181<dd>Efficiently Combining Collision Resistant Hash Functions&quot;; Proceedings 223<dd>Efficiently Combining Collision Resistant Hash Functions&quot;; Proceedings
… …
184<a class="reference external" href="http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts/hashing.html">http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts/hashing.html</a></dd> 226<a class="reference external" href="http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts/hashing.html">http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts/hashing.html</a></dd>
185<dt>[H04] Hawkes, P. and Paddon, M. and Rose, G. (2004). &quot;On Corrective</dt> 227<dt>[H04] Hawkes, P. and Paddon, M. and Rose, G. (2004). &quot;On Corrective</dt>
186<dd>Patterns for the SHA-2 Family&quot;. CRYPTO 2004 Cryptology ePrint Archive, 228<dd>Patterns for the SHA-2 Family&quot;. CRYPTO 2004 Cryptology ePrint Archive,
187Report 2004/204. Available online from: 229Report 2004/204. Available online from:
188<a class="reference external" href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/207.pdf">http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/207.pdf</a></dd> 230<a class="reference external" href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/207.pdf">http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/207.pdf</a></dd>
189<dt>[J04] Joux, Antoie. (2004). &quot;Multicollisions in Iterated Hash Functions</dt> 231<dt>[J04] Joux, Antoie. (2004). &quot;Multicollisions in Iterated Hash</dt>
190<dd><ul class="first simple">
191<li>Application to Cascaded Constructions;&quot; Proceedings of CRYPTO 2004,</li> 232<dd>Functions - Application to Cascaded Constructions;&quot; Proceedings of
192</ul> 233CRYPTO 2004, Franklin, M. (Ed); Lecture Notes in Computer Science
193<div class="system-message">
194<p class="system-message-title">System Message: WARNING/2 (<tt class="docutils">glep-0059.txt</tt>, line 139)</p>
195Bullet list ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent.</div>
196<p class="last">Franklin, M. (Ed); Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3152, pp.
197306-316. Available online from: 2343152, pp. 306-316. Available online from:
198<a class="reference external" href="http://web.cecs.pdx.edu/~teshrim/spring06/papers/general-attacks/multi-joux.pdf">http://web.cecs.pdx.edu/~teshrim/spring06/papers/general-attacks/multi-joux.pdf</a></p> 235<a class="reference external" href="http://web.cecs.pdx.edu/~teshrim/spring06/papers/general-attacks/multi-joux.pdf">http://web.cecs.pdx.edu/~teshrim/spring06/papers/general-attacks/multi-joux.pdf</a></dd>
199</dd>
200<dt>[K06a] Klima, V. (2006). &quot;Tunnels in Hash Functions: MD5 Collisions</dt> 236<dt>[K06a] Klima, V. (2006). &quot;Tunnels in Hash Functions: MD5 Collisions</dt>
201<dd>Within a Minute&quot;. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2006/105. 237<dd>Within a Minute&quot;. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2006/105.
202Available online from: <a class="reference external" href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/105.pdf">http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/105.pdf</a></dd> 238Available online from: <a class="reference external" href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/105.pdf">http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/105.pdf</a></dd>
203<dt>[K06b] Klima, V. (2006). &quot;Note and links to high-speed MD5 collision</dt> 239<dt>[K06b] Klima, V. (2006). &quot;Note and links to high-speed MD5 collision</dt>
204<dd>proof of concept tools&quot;. Available online from: 240<dd>proof of concept tools&quot;. Available online from:
… …
215version (August 17, 2004). Available online from: 251version (August 17, 2004). Available online from:
216<a class="reference external" href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/199.pdf">http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/199.pdf</a></dd> 252<a class="reference external" href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/199.pdf">http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/199.pdf</a></dd>
217</dl> 253</dl>
218</div> 254</div>
219<div class="section" id="thanks-to"> 255<div class="section" id="thanks-to">
220<h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id11">Thanks to</a></h1> 256<h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id14">Thanks to</a></h1>
221<dl class="docutils"> 257<dl class="docutils">
222<dt>I'd like to thank the following folks, in no specific order:</dt> 258<dt>I'd like to thank the following folks, in no specific order:</dt>
223<dd><ul class="first last simple"> 259<dd><ul class="first last simple">
224<li>Ciaran McCreesh (ciaranm) - for pointing out the Joux (2004) paper, 260<li>Ciaran McCreesh (ciaranm) - for pointing out the Joux (2004) paper,
225and also being stubborn enough in not accepting a partial solution.</li> 261and also being stubborn enough in not accepting a partial solution.</li>
… …
228codebase.</li> 264codebase.</li>
229</ul> 265</ul>
230</dd> 266</dd>
231</dl> 267</dl>
232</div> 268</div>
269<div class="section" id="id1">
270<h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id15">References</a></h1>
271<table class="docutils citation" frame="void" id="glep44" rules="none">
272<colgroup><col class="label" /><col /></colgroup>
273<tbody valign="top">
274<tr><td class="label">[GLEP44]</td><td>Mauch, M. (2005) GLEP44 - Manifest2 format.
275<a class="reference external" href="http://www.gentoo.org/proj/en/glep/glep-0044.html">http://www.gentoo.org/proj/en/glep/glep-0044.html</a></td></tr>
276</tbody>
277</table>
278</div>
233<div class="section" id="copyright"> 279<div class="section" id="copyright">
234<h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id12">Copyright</a></h1> 280<h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id16">Copyright</a></h1>
235<p>Copyright (c) 2006 by Robin Hugh Johnson. This material may be 281<p>Copyright (c) 2006-2010 by Robin Hugh Johnson. This material may be
236distributed only subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the 282distributed only subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the
237Open Publication License, v1.0.</p> 283Open Publication License, v1.0.</p>
238<p>vim: tw=72 ts=2 expandtab:</p> 284<!-- vim: tw=72 ts=2 expandtab: -->
239</div> 285</div>
240 286
241</div> 287</div>
242<div class="footer"> 288<div class="footer">
243<hr class="footer" /> 289<hr class="footer" />
244<a class="reference external" href="glep-0059.txt">View document source</a>. 290<a class="reference external" href="glep-0059.txt">View document source</a>.
245Generated on: 2008-10-21 23:29 UTC. 291Generated on: 2010-04-07 21:54 UTC.
246Generated by <a class="reference external" href="http://docutils.sourceforge.net/">Docutils</a> from <a class="reference external" href="http://docutils.sourceforge.net/rst.html">reStructuredText</a> source. 292Generated by <a class="reference external" href="http://docutils.sourceforge.net/">Docutils</a> from <a class="reference external" href="http://docutils.sourceforge.net/rst.html">reStructuredText</a> source.
247 293
248</div> 294</div>
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