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From: Alexander Gabert <gaberta@fh-trier.de> |
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|
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This patch reworks the logic behind GRKERNSEC_IO and GRKERNSEC_KMEM, making it less |
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intrusive and adding support for sysctl. |
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|
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The original patch is based on the work of Peter S. Mazinger (ps dot m at gmx dot net) |
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and Nedd Ludd <solar@gentoo.org>. |
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|
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Acked-by: Christian Heim <phreak@gentoo.org> |
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|
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|
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Index: linux-2.6.18/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c |
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=================================================================== |
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--- linux-2.6.18.orig/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c |
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+++ linux-2.6.18/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c |
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@@ -65,18 +65,21 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long |
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|
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if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS)) |
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return -EINVAL; |
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-#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO |
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+ |
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if (turn_on) { |
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- gr_handle_ioperm(); |
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+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO |
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+ if (!grsec_lock || (grsec_lock && grsec_enable_secure_io)) { |
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#else |
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- if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) |
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+ if (grsec_enable_secure_io) { |
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#endif |
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- return -EPERM; |
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-#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO |
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+ gr_handle_ioperm(); |
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+ return -EPERM; |
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+ } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) { |
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+ return -EPERM; |
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+ } |
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} |
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-#endif |
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- /* |
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- * If it's the first ioperm() call in this thread's lifetime, set the |
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+ |
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+ /* If it's the first ioperm() call in this thread's lifetime, set the |
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* IO bitmap up. ioperm() is much less timing critical than clone(), |
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* this is why we delay this operation until now: |
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*/ |
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@@ -152,13 +155,17 @@ asmlinkage long sys_iopl(unsigned long u |
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/* Trying to gain more privileges? */ |
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if (level > old) { |
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#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO |
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- gr_handle_iopl(); |
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- return -EPERM; |
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+ if (!grsec_lock || (grsec_lock && grsec_enable_secure_io)) { |
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#else |
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- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) |
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- return -EPERM; |
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+ if (grsec_enable_secure_io) { |
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#endif |
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+ gr_handle_iopl(); |
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+ return -EPERM; |
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+ } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) { |
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+ return -EPERM; |
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+ } |
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} |
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+ |
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t->iopl = level << 12; |
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regs->eflags = (regs->eflags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | t->iopl; |
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set_iopl_mask(t->iopl); |
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Index: linux-2.6.18/drivers/char/mem.c |
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=================================================================== |
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--- linux-2.6.18.orig/drivers/char/mem.c |
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+++ linux-2.6.18/drivers/char/mem.c |
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@@ -179,9 +179,13 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file * f |
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return -EFAULT; |
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|
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#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM |
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- gr_handle_mem_write(); |
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- return -EPERM; |
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+ if (!grsec_lock || (grsec_lock && grsec_enable_secure_kmem)) { |
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+#else |
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+ if (grsec_enable_secure_kmem) { |
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#endif |
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+ gr_handle_mem_write(); |
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+ return -EPERM; |
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+ } |
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|
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written = 0; |
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|
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@@ -260,9 +264,13 @@ static int mmap_mem(struct file * file, |
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vma->vm_page_prot); |
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|
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#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM |
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- if (gr_handle_mem_mmap(vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT, vma)) |
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- return -EPERM; |
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+ if (!grsec_lock || (grsec_lock && grsec_enable_secure_kmem)) { |
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+#else |
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+ if (grsec_enable_secure_kmem) { |
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#endif |
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+ if (gr_handle_mem_mmap(vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT, vma)) |
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+ return -EPERM; |
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+ } |
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|
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/* Remap-pfn-range will mark the range VM_IO and VM_RESERVED */ |
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if (remap_pfn_range(vma, |
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@@ -492,9 +500,13 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file * |
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char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */ |
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|
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#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM |
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- gr_handle_kmem_write(); |
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- return -EPERM; |
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+ if (!grsec_lock || (grsec_lock && grsec_enable_secure_kmem)) { |
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+#else |
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+ if (grsec_enable_secure_kmem) { |
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#endif |
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+ gr_handle_kmem_write(); |
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+ return -EPERM; |
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+ } |
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|
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if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) { |
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|
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@@ -802,9 +814,13 @@ static loff_t memory_lseek(struct file * |
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static int open_port(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp) |
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{ |
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#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM |
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- gr_handle_open_port(); |
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- return -EPERM; |
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+ if (!grsec_lock || (grsec_lock && grsec_enable_secure_kmem)) { |
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+#else |
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+ if (grsec_enable_secure_kmem) { |
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#endif |
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+ gr_handle_open_port(); |
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+ return -EPERM; |
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+ } |
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|
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return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM; |
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} |
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Index: linux-2.6.18/grsecurity/grsec_init.c |
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=================================================================== |
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--- linux-2.6.18.orig/grsecurity/grsec_init.c |
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+++ linux-2.6.18/grsecurity/grsec_init.c |
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@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ int grsec_enable_socket_client; |
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int grsec_socket_client_gid; |
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int grsec_enable_socket_server; |
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int grsec_socket_server_gid; |
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+int grsec_enable_secure_io; |
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+int grsec_enable_secure_kmem; |
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int grsec_resource_logging; |
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int grsec_lock; |
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|
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@@ -230,6 +232,12 @@ grsecurity_init(void) |
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grsec_enable_socket_server = 1; |
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grsec_socket_server_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID; |
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#endif |
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+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO |
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+ grsec_enable_secure_io = 1; |
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+#endif |
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+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM |
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+ grsec_enable_secure_kmem = 1; |
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+#endif |
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#endif |
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|
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return; |
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Index: linux-2.6.18/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c |
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=================================================================== |
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--- linux-2.6.18.orig/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c |
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+++ linux-2.6.18/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c |
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@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ GS_CHROOT_SYSCTL, GS_TPE, GS_TPE_GID, GS |
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GS_RANDPID, GS_SOCKET_ALL, GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID, GS_SOCKET_CLIENT, |
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GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID, GS_SOCKET_SERVER, GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID, |
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GS_GROUP, GS_GID, GS_ACHDIR, GS_AMOUNT, GS_AIPC, GS_DMSG, |
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-GS_TEXTREL, GS_FINDTASK, GS_SHM, GS_LOCK, GS_MODSTOP, GS_RESLOG}; |
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+GS_TEXTREL, GS_FINDTASK, GS_SHM, GS_IO, GS_KMEM, GS_LOCK, GS_MODSTOP, GS_RESLOG}; |
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|
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|
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ctl_table grsecurity_table[] = { |
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@@ -431,6 +431,26 @@ ctl_table grsecurity_table[] = { |
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.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, |
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}, |
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#endif |
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+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO |
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+ { |
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+ .ctl_name = GS_IO, |
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+ .procname = "secure_io", |
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+ .data = &grsec_enable_secure_io, |
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+ .maxlen = sizeof(int), |
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+ .mode = 0600, |
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+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, |
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+ }, |
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+#endif |
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+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM |
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+ { |
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+ .ctl_name = GS_KMEM, |
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+ .procname = "secure_kmem", |
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+ .data = &grsec_enable_secure_kmem, |
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+ .maxlen = sizeof(int), |
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+ .mode = 0600, |
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+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, |
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+ }, |
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+#endif |
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{ |
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.ctl_name = GS_LOCK, |
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.procname = "grsec_lock", |
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Index: linux-2.6.18/include/linux/grsecurity.h |
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=================================================================== |
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--- linux-2.6.18.orig/include/linux/grsecurity.h |
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+++ linux-2.6.18/include/linux/grsecurity.h |
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@@ -188,6 +188,8 @@ extern int gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsi |
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extern unsigned long pax_get_random_long(void); |
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#define get_random_long() pax_get_random_long() |
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|
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+extern int grsec_enable_secure_io; |
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+extern int grsec_enable_secure_kmem; |
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extern int grsec_enable_dmesg; |
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extern int grsec_enable_randsrc; |
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extern int grsec_enable_shm; |