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Fix up missing references to the unfinished tree-signing gleps that handle the GnuPG side and the developer process side.

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8 cardoe 1.1 <title>GLEP 57 -- Security of distribution of Gentoo software - Overview</title>
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22     <table class="rfc2822 docutils field-list" frame="void" rules="none">
23     <col class="field-name" />
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25     <tbody valign="top">
26     <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">GLEP:</th><td class="field-body">57</td>
27     </tr>
28     <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Title:</th><td class="field-body">Security of distribution of Gentoo software - Overview</td>
29     </tr>
30 robbat2 1.6 <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Version:</th><td class="field-body">1.4</td>
31 cardoe 1.1 </tr>
32 robbat2 1.6 <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Last-Modified:</th><td class="field-body"><a class="reference external" href="http://www.gentoo.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/xml/htdocs/proj/en/glep/glep-0057.txt?cvsroot=gentoo">2010/01/29 09:04:17</a></td>
33 cardoe 1.1 </tr>
34     <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Author:</th><td class="field-body">Robin Hugh Johnson &lt;robbat2&#32;&#97;t&#32;gentoo.org&gt;</td>
35     </tr>
36 robbat2 1.5 <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Status:</th><td class="field-body">Final</td>
37 cardoe 1.1 </tr>
38     <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Type:</th><td class="field-body">Informational</td>
39     </tr>
40     <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Content-Type:</th><td class="field-body"><a class="reference external" href="glep-0002.html">text/x-rst</a></td>
41     </tr>
42     <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Created:</th><td class="field-body">November 2005</td>
43     </tr>
44 robbat2 1.4 <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Updated:</th><td class="field-body">May 2006, October 2006, November 2007, June 2008, July 2008, October 2008, January 2010</td>
45 cardoe 1.1 </tr>
46 robbat2 1.4 <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Post-History:</th><td class="field-body">December 2009</td>
47 robbat2 1.3 </tr>
48 robbat2 1.5 <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Approved:</th><td class="field-body">18 January 2010</td>
49     </tr>
50 cardoe 1.1 </tbody>
51     </table>
52     <hr />
53     <div class="contents topic" id="contents">
54     <p class="topic-title first">Contents</p>
55     <ul class="simple">
56     <li><a class="reference internal" href="#abstract" id="id1">Abstract</a></li>
57     <li><a class="reference internal" href="#motivation" id="id2">Motivation</a></li>
58     <li><a class="reference internal" href="#specification" id="id3">Specification</a><ul>
59     <li><a class="reference internal" href="#system-elements" id="id4">System Elements</a></li>
60     <li><a class="reference internal" href="#processes" id="id5">Processes</a></li>
61     <li><a class="reference internal" href="#attacks-against-processes" id="id6">Attacks against Processes</a></li>
62     <li><a class="reference internal" href="#security-for-processes" id="id7">Security for Processes</a></li>
63     </ul>
64     </li>
65     <li><a class="reference internal" href="#backwards-compatibility" id="id8">Backwards Compatibility</a></li>
66     <li><a class="reference internal" href="#endnote-history-of-tree-signing-in-gentoo" id="id9">Endnote: History of tree-signing in Gentoo</a></li>
67     <li><a class="reference internal" href="#thanks" id="id10">Thanks</a></li>
68     <li><a class="reference internal" href="#references" id="id11">References</a></li>
69     <li><a class="reference internal" href="#copyright" id="id12">Copyright</a></li>
70     </ul>
71     </div>
72     <div class="section" id="abstract">
73     <h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id1">Abstract</a></h1>
74     <p>This is the first in a series of 4 GLEPs. It aims to define the actors
75     and problems in the Gentoo software distribution process, with a strong
76     emphasis on security. The concepts thus developed, will then be used in
77     the following GLEPs to describe a comprehensive security solution for
78     this distribution process that prevents trivial attacks and increases
79     the difficulty on more complex attacks.</p>
80     </div>
81     <div class="section" id="motivation">
82     <h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id2">Motivation</a></h1>
83     <p>Since at mid-2002 (see endnote: &quot;History of tree-signing in Gentoo&quot;),
84     many discussions have taken place on the gentoo-dev mailing list and in
85     many other places to design and implement a security strategy for the
86     distribution of files by the Gentoo project.</p>
87     <p>Usually the goal of such proposals was and is to be able to securely
88     identify the data provided by Gentoo and prevent third parties (like a
89     compromised mirror) from delivering harmful data (be it as modified
90     ebuilds, executable shell code or any other form) to the users of the
91     Gentoo MetaDistribution.</p>
92     <p>These strategies can neither prevent a malicious or compromised upstream
93     from injecting &quot;bad&quot; programs, nor can they stop a rogue developer from
94     committing malicious ebuilds. What they can do is to reduce the attack
95     vectors so that for example a compromised mirror will be detected and no
96     tainted data will be executed on user's systems.</p>
97     <p>Gentoo's software distribution system as it presently stands, contains a
98     number of security shortcomings. The last discussion on the gentoo-dev
99     mailing list [<a class="reference external" href="http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/38363">http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/38363</a>]
100     contains a good overview of most of the issues. Summarized here:</p>
101     <blockquote>
102     <ul class="simple">
103     <li>Unverifiable executable code distributed:
104     The most obvious instance are eclasses, but there are many other bits
105     of the tree that are not signed at all right now. Modifying that data
106     is trivial.</li>
107     <li>Shortcomings of existing Manifest verification
108     A lack and enforcement of policies, combined with suboptimal support
109     in portage, makes it trivial to modify or replace the existing
110     Manifests.</li>
111     <li>Vulnerability of existing infrastructure to attacks.
112     The previous two items make it possible for a skilled attacker to
113     design an attack and then execute it against specific portions of
114 robbat2 1.4 existing infrastructure (e.g.: Compromise a country-local rsync
115     mirror, and totally replace a package and it's Manifest).</li>
116 cardoe 1.1 </ul>
117     </blockquote>
118     </div>
119     <div class="section" id="specification">
120     <h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id3">Specification</a></h1>
121     <p>Security is not something that can be considered in isolation. It is
122     both an ongoing holistic process and lessons learnt by examining
123     previous shortcomings.</p>
124     <div class="section" id="system-elements">
125     <h2><a class="toc-backref" href="#id4">System Elements</a></h2>
126     <dl class="docutils">
127     <dt>There are a few entities to be considered:</dt>
128     <dd><ul class="first last simple">
129     <li>Upstream. The people who provide the program(s) or data we wish to
130     distribute.</li>
131     <li>Gentoo Developers. The people that package and test the things
132     provided by Upstream.</li>
133     <li>Gentoo Infrastructure. The people and hardware that allow the revision
134     control of metadata and distribution of the data and metadata provided
135     by Developers and Upstream.</li>
136     <li>Gentoo Mirrors. Hardware provided by external contributors that is not
137     or only marginally controlled by Gentoo Infrastructure. Needed to
138     achieve the scalability and performance needed for the substantial
139     Gentoo user base.</li>
140     <li>Gentoo Users. The people that use the Gentoo MetaDistribution.</li>
141     </ul>
142     </dd>
143     </dl>
144     <p>The data described here is usually programs and data files provided by
145     upstream; as this is a rather large amount of data it is usually
146     distributed over http or ftp from Gentoo Mirrors. This data is usually
147     labeled as &quot;distfiles&quot;. Metadata is all information describing how to
148     manipulate that data - it is usually called &quot;The Tree&quot; or &quot;The Portage
149     Tree&quot;, consists of many ebuilds, eclasses and supporting files and is
150     usually distributed over rsync. The central rsync servers are controlled
151     by Gentoo Infrastructure, but many third-party rsync mirrors exist that
152     help to reduce the load on those central servers. These extra mirrors
153     are not maintained by Gentoo Infrastructure.</p>
154     <p>Attacks may be conducted against any of these entities. Obviously
155     direct attacks against Upstream and Users are outside of the scope of
156     this series of GLEPs as they are not in any way controlled or
157     controllable by Gentoo - however attacks using Gentoo as a conduit
158 robbat2 1.4 (including malicious mirrors) must be considered.</p>
159 cardoe 1.1 </div>
160     <div class="section" id="processes">
161     <h2><a class="toc-backref" href="#id5">Processes</a></h2>
162     <p>There are two major processes in the distribution of Gentoo, where
163     security needs to be implemented:</p>
164     <blockquote>
165     <ul class="simple">
166     <li>Developer commits to version control systems controlled by
167     Infrastructure.</li>
168     <li>Tree and distfile distribution from Infrastructure to Users, via the
169     mirrors (this includes both HTTP and rsync distribution).</li>
170     </ul>
171     </blockquote>
172 robbat2 1.3 <p>Both processes need their security improved. In [#GLEPxx+2] we will discuss
173 cardoe 1.1 how to improve the security of the first process. The relatively
174     speaking simpler process of file distribution will be described in
175 robbat2 1.3 [#GLEP58]. Since it can be implemented without having to change the
176 cardoe 1.1 workflow and behaviour of developers we hope to get it done in a
177     reasonably short timeframe.</p>
178     </div>
179     <div class="section" id="attacks-against-processes">
180     <h2><a class="toc-backref" href="#id6">Attacks against Processes</a></h2>
181     <p>Attacks against the process #1 may be as complex as a malicious or
182     compromised developer (stolen SSH keys, rooted systems), or as simple as
183     a patch from a user that does a little more than it claims, and is not
184     adequately reviewed.</p>
185     <p>Attacks against the process #2 may be as simple as a single rooted
186     mirror, distributing a modified tree to the users of that mirror - or
187     some alteration of upstream sources. These attacks have a low cost and
188     are very hard to discover unless all distributed data is transparently
189     signed.</p>
190     <p>A simple example of such an attack and a partial solution for eclasses
191     is presented in [ <a class="reference external" href="http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/24677">http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/24677</a>
192     ]. It shows quite well that any non-Gentoo controlled rsync mirror can
193     modify executable code; as much of this code is per default run as root
194     a malicious mirror could compromise hundreds of systems per day - if
195     cloaked well enough, such an attack could run for weeks before being
196     noticed. As there are no effective safeguards right now users are left
197     with the choice of either syncing from the sometimes slow or even
198     unresponsive Gentoo-controlled rsync mirrors or risk being compromised
199     by syncing from one of the community-provided mirrors. We will show that
200     protection against this class of attacks is very easy to implement with
201     little added cost.</p>
202     <p>At the level of mirrors, addition of malicious content is not the only
203     attack. As discussed by Cappos et al [C08a,C08b], an attacker may use
204     exclusion and replay attacks, possibly only on a specific subset of
205     user to extend the window of opportunity on another exploit.</p>
206     </div>
207     <div class="section" id="security-for-processes">
208     <h2><a class="toc-backref" href="#id7">Security for Processes</a></h2>
209     <p>Protection for process #1 can never be complete (without major
210     modifications to our development process), as a malicious developer is
211     fully authorized to provide materials for distribution. Partial
212     protection can be gained by Portage and Infrastructure changes, but the
213     real improvements needed are developer education and continued
214 robbat2 1.3 vigilance. This is further discussed in [#GLEPxx+2].</p>
215 cardoe 1.1 <p>This security is still limited in scope - protection against compromised
216     developers is very expensive, and even complex systems like peer review
217     / multiple signatures can be broken by colluding developers. There are many
218     issues, be it social or technical, that increase the cost of such
219     measures a lot while only providing marginal security gains. Any
220     implementation proposal must be carefully analysed to find the best
221     security to developer hassle ratio.</p>
222     <p>Protection for process #2 is a different matter entirely. While it also
223     cannot be complete (as the User may be attacked directly), we can ensure
224     that Gentoo infrastructure and the mirrors are not a weak point. This
225     objective is actually much closer than it seems already - most of the
226     work has been completed for other things!. This is further discussed in
227 robbat2 1.3 [#GLEP58]. As this process has the most to gain in security, and the
228 cardoe 1.1 most immediate impact, it should be implemented before or at the same
229     time as any changes to process #1. Security at this layer is already
230     available in the signed daily snapshots, but we can extend it to cover
231     the rsync mirrors as well.</p>
232     <p>Requirements pertaining to and management of keys (OpenPGP or otherwise)
233     is an issue that affects both processes, and is broken out into a
234     separate GLEP due to the technical complexity of the subject.
235     This deals with everything including: types of keys to use; usage
236     guidelines; procedures for managing signatures and trust for keys,
237     including cases of lost (destroyed) and stolen (or otherwise turned
238     malicious) keys.</p>
239     </div>
240     </div>
241     <div class="section" id="backwards-compatibility">
242     <h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id8">Backwards Compatibility</a></h1>
243     <p>As an informational GLEP, this document has no direct impact on
244     backwards compatibility. However the related in-depth documents may
245     delve further into any issues of backwards compatibility.</p>
246     </div>
247     <div class="section" id="endnote-history-of-tree-signing-in-gentoo">
248     <h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id9">Endnote: History of tree-signing in Gentoo</a></h1>
249     <p>This is a brief review of every previous tree-signing discussion, the
250     stuff before 2003-04-03 was very hard to come by, so I apologize if I've
251     missed a discussion (I would like to hear about it). I think there was
252     a very early private discussion with drobbins in 2001, as it's vaguely
253     referenced, but I can't find it anywhere.</p>
254     <p>2002-06-06, gentoo-dev mailing list, users first ask about signing of
255     ebuilds:
256     [ <a class="reference external" href="http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/1950">http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/1950</a> ]</p>
257     <p>2003-01-13, gentoo-dev mailing list, &quot;Re: Verifying portage is from
258     Gentoo&quot; - Paul de Vrieze (pauldv):
259     [ <a class="reference external" href="http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/6619/focus=6619">http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/6619/focus=6619</a> ]</p>
260     <p>2003-04, GWN articles announcing tree signing:
261     [ <a class="reference external" href="http://www.gentoo.org/news/en/gwn/20030407-newsletter.xml#doc_chap1_sect3">http://www.gentoo.org/news/en/gwn/20030407-newsletter.xml#doc_chap1_sect3</a> ]
262     [ <a class="reference external" href="http://www.gentoo.org/news/en/gwn/20030421-newsletter.xml#doc_chap1_sect2">http://www.gentoo.org/news/en/gwn/20030421-newsletter.xml#doc_chap1_sect2</a> ]</p>
263     <p>2003-04, gentoo-security mailing list, &quot;The state of ebuild signing
264     in portage&quot; - Joshua Brindle (method), the first suggestion of signed Manifests,
265     but also an unusual key-trust model:
266     [ <a class="reference external" href="http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=gentoo-security&amp;m=105073449619892&amp;w=2">http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=gentoo-security&amp;m=105073449619892&amp;w=2</a> ]</p>
267     <p>2003-04, gentoo-core mailing list, &quot;New Digests and Signing -- Attempted Explanation&quot;</p>
268     <p>2003-06, gentoo-core mailing list, &quot;A quick guide to GPG and key
269     signing.&quot; - This overview was one of the first to help developers see
270     how to use their devs, and was mainly intended for keysigning meetups.</p>
271     <p>2003-08-09, gentoo-core mailing list, &quot;Ebuild signing&quot; - status query,
272     with an not very positive response, delayed by Nick Jones (carpaski)
273     getting rooted and a safe cleanup taking a long time to affect.</p>
274     <p>2003-12-02, gentoo-core mailing list, &quot;Report: rsync1.it.gentoo.org compromised&quot;</p>
275     <p>2003-12-03, gentoo-core mailing list, &quot;Signing of ebuilds&quot;</p>
276     <p>2003-12-07, gentoo-core mailing list, &quot;gpg signing of Manifests&quot;, thread
277     includes the first GnuPG signing prototype code, by Robin H. Johnson
278     (robbat2). Andrew Cowie (rac) also produces a proof-of-concept around
279     this time.</p>
280     <p>2004-03-23, gentoo-dev mailing list, &quot;2004.1 will not include a secure
281     portage&quot; - Kurt Lieber (klieber). Signing is nowhere near ready for
282     2004.1 release, and it is realized that it there is insufficient traction
283     and the problem is very large. Many arguments about the checking and
284     verification side. First warning signs that MD5 might be broken in the
285     near future.
286     [ <a class="reference external" href="http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/16876">http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/16876</a> ]</p>
287     <p>2004-03-25, gentoo-dev mailing list, &quot;Redux: 2004.1 will not include a
288     secure portage&quot; - Robin H. Johnson (robbat2). Yet another proposal,
289     summarizing the points of the previous thread and this time trying to
290     track the various weaknesses.
291     <a class="reference external" href="http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=gentoo-dev&amp;m=108017986400698&amp;w=2">http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=gentoo-dev&amp;m=108017986400698&amp;w=2</a></p>
292     <p>2004-05-31, Gentoo managers meeting, portage team reports that
293     FEATURES=sign is now available, but large questions still exist over
294     verification policies and procedures, as well as handing of keys.
295     [ <a class="reference external" href="http://www.gentoo.org/proj/en/devrel/manager-meetings/logs/2004/20040531.txt">http://www.gentoo.org/proj/en/devrel/manager-meetings/logs/2004/20040531.txt</a> ]</p>
296     <p>2005-01-17, gentoo-core mailing list, &quot;Global objective for 2005 :
297     portage signing&quot;. Thierry Carrez (koon) suggests that more go into
298     tree-signing work. Problems at the time later in the thread show that
299     the upstream gpg-agent is not ready, amongst other minor implementation
300     issues.</p>
301     <p>2005-02-20, gentoo-dev mailing list, &quot;post-LWE 2005&quot; - Brian Harring
302     (ferringb). A discussion on the ongoing lack of signing, and that
303     eclasses and profiles need to be signed as well, but this seems to be
304     hanging on GLEP33 in the meantime.
305     [ <a class="reference external" href="http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/25556/focus=25596">http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/25556/focus=25596</a> ]</p>
306     <p>2005-03-08, gentoo-core mailing list, &quot;gpg manifest signing stats&quot;.
307     Informal statistics show that 26% of packages in the tree include a
308     signed Manifest. Questions are raised regarding key types, and key
309     policies.</p>
310     <p>2005-11-16, gentoo-core mailing list, &quot;Gentoo key signing practices and
311     official Gentoo keyring&quot;. A discussion of key handling and other
312     outstanding issues, also mentioning partial Manifests, as well as a
313     comparision between the signing procedures used in Slackware, Debian and
314     RPM-based distros.</p>
315     <p>2005-11-19, gentoo-portage-dev mailing list, &quot;Manifest signing&quot; - Robin
316     H. Johnson (robbat2) follows up the previous -core posting, discussion
317     implementation issues.
318     [ <a class="reference external" href="http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.portage.devel/1401">http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.portage.devel/1401</a> ]</p>
319     <p>2006-05-18, gentoo-dev mailing list, &quot;Signing everything, for fun and for
320     profit&quot; - Patrick Lauer (bonsaikitten). Later brings up that Manifest2 is needed for
321     getting everything right.
322     [ <a class="reference external" href="http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/38363">http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/38363</a> ]</p>
323     <p>2006-05-19, gentoo-dev mailing list, &quot;Re: Signing everything, for fun and for
324     profit&quot; - Robin H. Johnson (robbat2). An introduction into some of the
325     OpenPGP standard, with a focus on how it affects file signing, key
326     signing, management of keys, and revocation.
327     [ <a class="reference external" href="http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/38363/focus=38371">http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/38363/focus=38371</a> ]</p>
328     <p>2007-04-11, gentoo-dev mailing list, &quot;Re: <em>DEVELOPMENT</em> mail list,
329     right?&quot; - Robin H. Johnson (robbat2). A progress report on these very
330     GLEPs.
331     [ <a class="reference external" href="http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/47752/focus=47908">http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/47752/focus=47908</a> ]</p>
332     <p>2007-07-02, gentoo-dev mailing list, &quot;Re: Re: Nominations open for the
333     Gentoo Council 2007/08&quot; - Robin H. Johnson (robbat2). Another progress
334     report.
335     [ <a class="reference external" href="http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/50029/focus=50043">http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/50029/focus=50043</a> ]</p>
336     <p>2007-11-30, portage-dev alias, &quot;Manifest2 and Tree-signing&quot; - Robin H.
337     Johnson (robbat2). First review thread for these GLEPs, many suggestions
338     from Marius Mauch (genone).</p>
339     <p>2008-04-03, gentoo-dev mailing list, &quot;Re: Monthly Gentoo Council
340     Reminder for April&quot; - Ciaran McCreesh (ciaranm). A thread in which
341     Ciaran reminds everybody that simply making all the developers sign the
342 robbat2 1.4 tree is not sufficient to prevent all attacks.
343 cardoe 1.1 [ <a class="reference external" href="http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/55508/focus=55542">http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/55508/focus=55542</a> ]</p>
344     <p>2008-07-01, gentoo-portage-dev mailing list, &quot;proto-GLEPS for
345     Tree-signing&quot; - Robin H. Johnson (robbat2). Thread looking for review
346     input from Portage developers.
347     [ <a class="reference external" href="http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.portage.devel/2686">http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.portage.devel/2686</a> ]</p>
348     <p>2008-07-12, gentoo-portage-dev mailing list, &quot;proto-GLEPS for
349     Tree-signing, take 2&quot; - Robin H. Johnson (robbat2). Integration of
350     changes from previous review, and a prototype for the signing code.
351     zmedico also posts a patch for a verification prototype.
352     [ <a class="reference external" href="http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.portage.devel/2709">http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.portage.devel/2709</a> ]</p>
353     </div>
354     <div class="section" id="thanks">
355     <h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id10">Thanks</a></h1>
356     <p>I'd like to thank Patrick Lauer (bonsaikitten) for prodding me
357     to keep working on the tree-signing project, as well helping with
358     spelling, grammar, research (esp. tracking down every possible
359     vulnerability that has been mentioned in past discussions, and
360     integrating them in this overview).</p>
361     </div>
362     <div class="section" id="references">
363     <h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id11">References</a></h1>
364     <dl class="docutils">
365     <dt>[C08a] Cappos, J et al. (2008). &quot;Package Management Security&quot;.</dt>
366     <dd>University of Arizona Technical Report TR08-02. Available online
367     from: <a class="reference external" href="ftp://ftp.cs.arizona.edu/reports/2008/TR08-02.pdf">ftp://ftp.cs.arizona.edu/reports/2008/TR08-02.pdf</a></dd>
368     <dt>[C08b] Cappos, J et al. (2008). &quot;Attacks on Package Managers&quot;</dt>
369     <dd>Available online at:
370     <a class="reference external" href="http://www.cs.arizona.edu/people/justin/packagemanagersecurity/">http://www.cs.arizona.edu/people/justin/packagemanagersecurity/</a></dd>
371     </dl>
372 robbat2 1.6 <div class="system-message">
373     <p class="system-message-title">System Message: WARNING/2 (<tt class="docutils">glep-0057.txt</tt>, line 340)</p>
374     Definition list ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent.</div>
375     <p>[#GLEPxx+2] Future GLEP on Developer Process security.
376     [#GLEPxx+3] Future GLEP on GnuPG Policies and Handling.</p>
377 cardoe 1.1 </div>
378     <div class="section" id="copyright">
379     <h1><a class="toc-backref" href="#id12">Copyright</a></h1>
380 robbat2 1.4 <p>Copyright (c) 2005-2010 by Robin Hugh Johnson. This material may be
381 cardoe 1.1 distributed only subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the
382     Open Publication License, v1.0.</p>
383     <p>vim: tw=72 ts=2 expandtab:</p>
384     </div>
386     </div>
387     <div class="footer">
388     <hr class="footer" />
389     <a class="reference external" href="glep-0057.txt">View document source</a>.
390 robbat2 1.6 Generated on: 2010-02-07 16:18 UTC.
391 cardoe 1.1 Generated by <a class="reference external" href="http://docutils.sourceforge.net/">Docutils</a> from <a class="reference external" href="http://docutils.sourceforge.net/rst.html">reStructuredText</a> source.
393     </div>
394     </body>
395     </html>

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