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GLEP: 57 |
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Title: Security of distribution of Gentoo software - Overview |
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Version: $Revision: 1.13 $ |
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Last-Modified: $Date: 2008/10/09 23:23:12 $ |
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Author: Robin Hugh Johnson <robbat2@gentoo.org> |
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Status: Draft |
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Type: Informational |
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Content-Type: text/x-rst |
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Created: November 2005 |
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Updated: May 2006, October 2006, Novemeber 2007, June 2008, July 2008, October 2008 |
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|
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Abstract |
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======== |
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This is the first in a series of 4 GLEPs. It aims to define the actors |
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and problems in the Gentoo software distribution process, with a strong |
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emphasis on security. The concepts thus developed, will then be used in |
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the following GLEPs to describe a comprehensive security solution for |
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this distribution process that prevents trivial attacks and increases |
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the difficulty on more complex attacks. |
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|
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Motivation |
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========== |
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Since at mid-2002 (see endnote: "History of tree-signing in Gentoo"), |
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many discussions have taken place on the gentoo-dev mailing list and in |
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many other places to design and implement a security strategy for the |
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distribution of files by the Gentoo project. |
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|
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Usually the goal of such proposals was and is to be able to securely |
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identify the data provided by Gentoo and prevent third parties (like a |
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compromised mirror) from delivering harmful data (be it as modified |
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ebuilds, executable shell code or any other form) to the users of the |
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Gentoo MetaDistribution. |
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|
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These strategies can neither prevent a malicious or compromised upstream |
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from injecting "bad" programs, nor can they stop a rogue developer from |
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committing malicious ebuilds. What they can do is to reduce the attack |
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vectors so that for example a compromised mirror will be detected and no |
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tainted data will be executed on user's systems. |
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|
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Gentoo's software distribution system as it presently stands, contains a |
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number of security shortcomings. The last discussion on the gentoo-dev |
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mailing list [http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/38363] |
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contains a good overview of most of the issues. Summarized here: |
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|
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- Unverifiable executable code distributed: |
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The most obvious instance are eclasses, but there are many other bits |
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of the tree that are not signed at all right now. Modifying that data |
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is trivial. |
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- Shortcomings of existing Manifest verification |
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A lack and enforcement of policies, combined with suboptimal support |
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in portage, makes it trivial to modify or replace the existing |
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Manifests. |
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- Vulnerability of existing infrastructure to attacks. |
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The previous two items make it possible for a skilled attacker to |
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design an attack and then execute it against specific portions of |
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existing infrastructure (eg: Compromise a country-local rsync mirror, |
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and totally replace a package and it's Manifest). |
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|
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Specification |
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============= |
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Security is not something that can be considered in isolation. It is |
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both an ongoing holistic process and lessons learnt by examining |
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previous shortcomings. |
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|
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System Elements |
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--------------- |
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There are a few entities to be considered: |
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- Upstream. The people who provide the program(s) or data we wish to |
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distribute. |
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- Gentoo Developers. The people that package and test the things |
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provided by Upstream. |
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- Gentoo Infrastructure. The people and hardware that allow the revision |
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control of metadata and distribution of the data and metadata provided |
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by Developers and Upstream. |
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- Gentoo Mirrors. Hardware provided by external contributors that is not |
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or only marginally controlled by Gentoo Infrastructure. Needed to |
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achieve the scalability and performance needed for the substantial |
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Gentoo user base. |
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- Gentoo Users. The people that use the Gentoo MetaDistribution. |
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|
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The data described here is usually programs and data files provided by |
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upstream; as this is a rather large amount of data it is usually |
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distributed over http or ftp from Gentoo Mirrors. This data is usually |
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labeled as "distfiles". Metadata is all information describing how to |
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manipulate that data - it is usually called "The Tree" or "The Portage |
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Tree", consists of many ebuilds, eclasses and supporting files and is |
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usually distributed over rsync. The central rsync servers are controlled |
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by Gentoo Infrastructure, but many third-party rsync mirrors exist that |
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help to reduce the load on those central servers. These extra mirrors |
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are not maintained by Gentoo Infrastructure. |
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|
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Attacks may be conducted against any of these entities. Obviously |
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direct attacks against Upstream and Users are outside of the scope of |
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this series of GLEPs as they are not in any way controlled or |
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controllable by Gentoo - however attacks using Gentoo as a conduit |
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(including malicous mirrors) must be considered. |
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|
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Processes |
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--------- |
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There are two major processes in the distribution of Gentoo, where |
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security needs to be implemented: |
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|
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- Developer commits to version control systems controlled by |
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Infrastructure. |
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- Tree and distfile distribution from Infrastructure to Users, via the |
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mirrors (this includes both HTTP and rsync distribution). |
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|
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Both processes need their security improved. In [GLEPxx+2] we will discuss |
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how to improve the security of the first process. The relatively |
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speaking simpler process of file distribution will be described in |
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[GLEPxx+1]. Since it can be implemented without having to change the |
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workflow and behaviour of developers we hope to get it done in a |
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reasonably short timeframe. |
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|
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Attacks against Processes |
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------------------------- |
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Attacks against the process #1 may be as complex as a malicious or |
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compromised developer (stolen SSH keys, rooted systems), or as simple as |
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a patch from a user that does a little more than it claims, and is not |
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adequately reviewed. |
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|
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Attacks against the process #2 may be as simple as a single rooted |
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mirror, distributing a modified tree to the users of that mirror - or |
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some alteration of upstream sources. These attacks have a low cost and |
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are very hard to discover unless all distributed data is transparently |
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signed. |
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|
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A simple example of such an attack and a partial solution for eclasses |
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is presented in [ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/24677 |
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]. It shows quite well that any non-Gentoo controlled rsync mirror can |
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modify executable code; as much of this code is per default run as root |
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a malicious mirror could compromise hundreds of systems per day - if |
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cloaked well enough, such an attack could run for weeks before being |
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noticed. As there are no effective safeguards right now users are left |
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with the choice of either syncing from the sometimes slow or even |
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unresponsive Gentoo-controlled rsync mirrors or risk being compromised |
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by syncing from one of the community-provided mirrors. We will show that |
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protection against this class of attacks is very easy to implement with |
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little added cost. |
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|
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At the level of mirrors, addition of malicious content is not the only |
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attack. As discussed by Cappos et al [C08a,C08b], an attacker may use |
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exclusion and replay attacks, possibly only on a specific subset of |
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user to extend the window of opportunity on another exploit. |
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|
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Security for Processes |
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------------------------ |
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Protection for process #1 can never be complete (without major |
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modifications to our development process), as a malicious developer is |
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fully authorized to provide materials for distribution. Partial |
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protection can be gained by Portage and Infrastructure changes, but the |
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real improvements needed are developer education and continued |
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vigilance. This is further discussed in [GLEPxx+2]. |
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|
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This security is still limited in scope - protection against compromised |
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developers is very expensive, and even complex systems like peer review |
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/ multiple signatures can be broken by colluding developers. There are many |
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issues, be it social or technical, that increase the cost of such |
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measures a lot while only providing marginal security gains. Any |
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implementation proposal must be carefully analysed to find the best |
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security to developer hassle ratio. |
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|
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Protection for process #2 is a different matter entirely. While it also |
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cannot be complete (as the User may be attacked directly), we can ensure |
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that Gentoo infrastructure and the mirrors are not a weak point. This |
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objective is actually much closer than it seems already - most of the |
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work has been completed for other things!. This is further discussed in |
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[GLEP58]. As this process has the most to gain in security, and the |
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most immediate impact, it should be implemented before or at the same |
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time as any changes to process #1. Security at this layer is already |
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available in the signed daily snapshots, but we can extend it to cover |
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the rsync mirrors as well. |
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|
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Requirements pertaining to and management of keys (OpenPGP or otherwise) |
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is an issue that affects both processes, and is broken out into a |
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separate GLEP due to the technical complexity of the subject. |
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This deals with everything including: types of keys to use; usage |
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guidelines; procedures for managing signatures and trust for keys, |
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including cases of lost (destroyed) and stolen (or otherwise turned |
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malicious) keys. |
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|
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Backwards Compatibility |
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======================= |
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As an informational GLEP, this document has no direct impact on |
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backwards compatibility. However the related in-depth documents may |
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delve further into any issues of backwards compatibility. |
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|
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Endnote: History of tree-signing in Gentoo |
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========================================== |
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This is a brief review of every previous tree-signing discussion, the |
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stuff before 2003-04-03 was very hard to come by, so I apologize if I've |
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missed a discussion (I would like to hear about it). I think there was |
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a very early private discussion with drobbins in 2001, as it's vaguely |
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referenced, but I can't find it anywhere. |
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|
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2002-06-06, gentoo-dev mailing list, users first ask about signing of |
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ebuilds: |
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[ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/1950 ] |
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|
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2003-01-13, gentoo-dev mailing list, "Re: Verifying portage is from |
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Gentoo" - Paul de Vrieze (pauldv): |
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[ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/6619/focus=6619 ] |
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|
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2003-04, GWN articles announcing tree signing: |
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[ http://www.gentoo.org/news/en/gwn/20030407-newsletter.xml#doc_chap1_sect3 ] |
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[ http://www.gentoo.org/news/en/gwn/20030421-newsletter.xml#doc_chap1_sect2 ] |
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|
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2003-04, gentoo-security mailing list, "The state of ebuild signing |
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in portage" - Joshua Brindle (method), the first suggestion of signed Manifests, |
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but also an unusual key-trust model: |
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[ http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=gentoo-security&m=105073449619892&w=2 ] |
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|
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2003-04, gentoo-core mailing list, "New Digests and Signing -- Attempted Explanation" |
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|
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2003-06, gentoo-core mailing list, "A quick guide to GPG and key |
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signing." - This overview was one of the first to help developers see |
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how to use their devs, and was mainly intended for keysigning meetups. |
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|
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2003-08-09, gentoo-core mailing list, "Ebuild signing" - status query, |
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with an not very positive response, delayed by Nick Jones (carpaski) |
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getting rooted and a safe cleanup taking a long time to affect. |
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|
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2003-12-02, gentoo-core mailing list, "Report: rsync1.it.gentoo.org compromised" |
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|
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2003-12-03, gentoo-core mailing list, "Signing of ebuilds" |
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|
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2003-12-07, gentoo-core mailing list, "gpg signing of Manifests", thread |
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includes the first GnuPG signing prototype code, by Robin H. Johnson |
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(robbat2). Andrew Cowie (rac) also produces a proof-of-concept around |
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this time. |
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|
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2004-03-23, gentoo-dev mailing list, "2004.1 will not include a secure |
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portage" - Kurt Lieber (klieber). Signing is nowhere near ready for |
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2004.1 release, and it is realized that it there is insufficient traction |
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and the problem is very large. Many arguments about the checking and |
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verification side. First warning signs that MD5 might be broken in the |
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near future. |
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[ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/16876 ] |
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|
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2004-03-25, gentoo-dev mailing list, "Redux: 2004.1 will not include a |
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secure portage" - Robin H. Johnson (robbat2). Yet another proposal, |
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summarizing the points of the previous thread and this time trying to |
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track the various weaknesses. |
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http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=gentoo-dev&m=108017986400698&w=2 |
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|
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2004-05-31, Gentoo managers meeting, portage team reports that |
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FEATURES=sign is now available, but large questions still exist over |
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verification policies and procedures, as well as handing of keys. |
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[ http://www.gentoo.org/proj/en/devrel/manager-meetings/logs/2004/20040531.txt ] |
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|
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2005-01-17, gentoo-core mailing list, "Global objective for 2005 : |
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portage signing". Thierry Carrez (koon) suggests that more go into |
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tree-signing work. Problems at the time later in the thread show that |
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the upstream gpg-agent is not ready, amongst other minor implementation |
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issues. |
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|
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2005-02-20, gentoo-dev mailing list, "post-LWE 2005" - Brian Harring |
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(ferringb). A discussion on the ongoing lack of signing, and that |
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eclasses and profiles need to be signed as well, but this seems to be |
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hanging on GLEP33 in the meantime. |
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[ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/25556/focus=25596 ] |
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|
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2005-03-08, gentoo-core mailing list, "gpg manifest signing stats". |
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Informal statistics show that 26% of packages in the tree include a |
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signed Manifest. Questions are raised regarding key types, and key |
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policies. |
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|
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2005-11-16, gentoo-core mailing list, "Gentoo key signing practices and |
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official Gentoo keyring". A discussion of key handling and other |
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outstanding issues, also mentioning partial Manifests, as well as a |
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comparision between the signing procedures used in Slackware, Debian and |
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RPM-based distros. |
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|
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2005-11-19, gentoo-portage-dev mailing list, "Manifest signing" - Robin |
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H. Johnson (robbat2) follows up the previous -core posting, discussion |
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implementation issues. |
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[ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.portage.devel/1401 ] |
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|
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2006-05-18, gentoo-dev mailing list, "Signing everything, for fun and for |
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profit" - Patrick Lauer (bonsaikitten). Later brings up that Manifest2 is needed for |
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getting everything right. |
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[ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/38363 ] |
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|
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2006-05-19, gentoo-dev mailing list, "Re: Signing everything, for fun and for |
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profit" - Robin H. Johnson (robbat2). An introduction into some of the |
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OpenPGP standard, with a focus on how it affects file signing, key |
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signing, management of keys, and revocation. |
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[ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/38363/focus=38371 ] |
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|
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2007-04-11, gentoo-dev mailing list, "Re: *DEVELOPMENT* mail list, |
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right?" - Robin H. Johnson (robbat2). A progress report on these very |
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GLEPs. |
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[ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/47752/focus=47908 ] |
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|
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2007-07-02, gentoo-dev mailing list, "Re: Re: Nominations open for the |
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Gentoo Council 2007/08" - Robin H. Johnson (robbat2). Another progress |
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report. |
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[ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/50029/focus=50043 ] |
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|
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2007-11-30, portage-dev alias, "Manifest2 and Tree-signing" - Robin H. |
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Johnson (robbat2). First review thread for these GLEPs, many suggestions |
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from Marius Mauch (genone). |
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|
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2008-04-03, gentoo-dev mailing list, "Re: Monthly Gentoo Council |
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Reminder for April" - Ciaran McCreesh (ciaranm). A thread in which |
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Ciaran reminds everybody that simply making all the developers sign the |
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tree is not sufficent to prevent all attacks. |
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[ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.devel/55508/focus=55542 ] |
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|
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2008-07-01, gentoo-portage-dev mailing list, "proto-GLEPS for |
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Tree-signing" - Robin H. Johnson (robbat2). Thread looking for review |
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input from Portage developers. |
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[ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.portage.devel/2686 ] |
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|
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2008-07-12, gentoo-portage-dev mailing list, "proto-GLEPS for |
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Tree-signing, take 2" - Robin H. Johnson (robbat2). Integration of |
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changes from previous review, and a prototype for the signing code. |
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zmedico also posts a patch for a verification prototype. |
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[ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.gentoo.portage.devel/2709 ] |
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|
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Thanks |
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====== |
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I'd like to thank Patrick Lauer (bonsaikitten) for prodding me |
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to keep working on the tree-signing project, as well helping with |
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spelling, grammar, research (esp. tracking down every possible |
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vulnerability that has been mentioned in past discussions, and |
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integrating them in this overview). |
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|
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References |
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========== |
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|
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[C08a] Cappos, J et al. (2008). "Package Management Security". |
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University of Arizona Technical Report TR08-02. Available online |
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from: ftp://ftp.cs.arizona.edu/reports/2008/TR08-02.pdf |
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[C08b] Cappos, J et al. (2008). "Attacks on Package Managers" |
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Available online at: |
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http://www.cs.arizona.edu/people/justin/packagemanagersecurity/ |
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|
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Copyright |
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========= |
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Copyright (c) 2006 by Robin Hugh Johnson. This material may be |
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distributed only subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the |
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Open Publication License, v1.0. |
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|
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